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Abstract 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effect of changing the retirement age on 
employment. Base on individual data from Hungary, a country where a number of hikes 
increased the retirement age between 1997 and 2009, this analysis benefits from substantial 
variation in pension eligibility during a relatively short time. It is based on a difference-in-
difference approach and supported by independent variation in the age-based eligibility rule 
contributing to the causal identification of the effect. Results suggest that the effect of the 
changes in early retirement age is substantial, amounting to 5-7.4 percentage point increase in 
the 45 per cent employment rate at the retirement age for women. Changes in the normal 
retirement age do not seem to have such employment effect because increases in disability 
pension claims have counteracted them. 
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Milyen hatással van a nyugdíjkorhatár emelése az idősebb 
nők foglalkoztatási rátájára? 
Empirikus eredmények a 2000-es évek magyarországi nyugdíjkorhatár  
emelései alapján 
 
Cseres-Gergely Zsombor 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Ez a tanulmány empirikus eredményekkel szolgál a nyugdíjkorhatár emelésének hatásáról. Az 
elemzés magyarországi egyéni adatokat használ egy olyan időszakból, amikor a korhatár több-
szöri, 1997 és 2009 közötti emelése jelenetős változásokat hozott viszonylag rövid idő alatt. A 
hatást a „különbségek különbsége” módszerrel vizsgálom, amihez a korhatár kohorszokhoz kötő-
dő és egyik évről a másikra élesen változó emelkedése járul független variabilitással, lehetővé 
téve az oksági kapcsolat vizsgálatát. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a változások jelentőst 
hatást gyakorolnak a női foglalkoztatásra az előrehozott nyugdíjkorhatárnál, mintegy 5-7,4 szá-
zalékponttal megemelve az átlagosan 45 százalékos foglalkoztatási arányt. A korbetöltött nyugdí-
jazás esetében ilyen hatás nem figyelhető meg, főként azért, mert a rokkantnyugdíj igénybevéte-
lének növekedése ellensúlyozta az öregségi nyugdíj igénybevételének csökkenését. 
 
Tárgyszavak: nyugdíjkorhatár, idősebb munkavállalók, foglalkoztatás 
 
JEL kódok: H31, H55, J14, J26 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ageing and its interaction with the labour market is a major interest to policymakers wanting to 
boost economic activity of the population and lighten the load of the state budget. One of the 
ways to achieve both goals at the same time is to increase the pension age, a main parameter of 
pension systems. This is an idea that seems quite appealing as the state pension, at least many 
European countries, is a major exit route from the labour market. 
Figure 1  
Employment rate of the 15-64 and 55-64 year old population in the EU-27 and in 
Hungary 
EU-27 Hungary 
  
Source: EUROSTAT data, tps00180 and tsdde100 
 
Hungary is a EU member state where one of the main direct causes of low employment was 
early retirement for two decades. Also because early retirement was used extensively in the east-
ern part of the EU (Vanhuysse 2006), increasing the retirement age was started in Hungary rela-
tively early, in the late-middle 1990s. In a period when similar trends were unfolding within the 
EU, employment of the 55-64 year olds in Hungary has increased from 40 per cent to around 70 
per cent of that in the EU (see Figure 1). 
From 1995 to 2009, retirement age for women increased from 55 to 62, and from 60 to 62 
years of age for men. In a comprehensive account of early retirement and labour market partici-
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pation (Monostori 2008) emphasises the connection between these changes and the increased 
employment rate of older people. Decomposing the increases of economic activity by various 
subgroups (Kátay and Nobilis 2009) showed that during the beginning of the 2000s, changes in 
pension regulation had an important contribution to the activity of older people. Analysing in-
centives for claiming state pension shows that besides financial incentives, availability of the 
state pension was a decisive factor in the timing of retirement in Hungary (Cseres-Gergely 
2008). 
There is good reason to believe that rising the eligibility age for a major pension benefit will 
effectively delay retirement from the labour market. (Stock and Wise 1990) model retirement 
incentives in the US, (Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, and Schnabel 2002) in Germany to look at the ef-
fect of financial incentives. Both find that beside those, the time remaining to reaching pension 
age has an effect on retirement and before that, on claiming the company and state pensions, 
respectively. Summarising the results of a comprehensive cross-country research, (Gruber and 
Wise 2004) reports similar overall evidence. 
The connection between the retirement age and labour market activity was an important re-
search interest for some time, but only recent years brought methods that employ techniques 
that do not rely on out of sample projections. A notable first example of these is (Mastrobuoni 
2009), who stresses the importance of norms, life-cycle- and other effects that are unlikely to be 
identified from the behaviour of populations not actually affected by the intervention. He ex-
ploits the increase of the normal retirement age in the US for cohorts born in 1938 and thereaf-
ter, identifying the effect of the intervention with discontinuities in the controlled cohort profile. 
His results are fairly robust and show that the response to the reform is rather strong, implying 
one month delay in retirement for a two month increase in the retirement. The idea of 
(Mastrobuoni 2009) is taken further by (Staubli and Zweimüller 2011) and more recently (Cribb, 
Emmerson, and Tetlow 2013). The former used a difference in difference framework and fine 
administrative data from Austria on all retirees to look at the effect of increasing the early re-
tirement age by 26 months. Considering multiple outcomes, the study finds that the intervention 
was followed by a drop of 19 and 25 percentage points in the rate of pension claims for men and 
women respectively, as well as a 7 and 10 percentage point increase in employment rates. Unem-
ployment has increased too by 10 and 11 per cent respectively, but not the inflow to disability 
pension. (Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow 2013) use a similar identification strategy but survey 
data to look at the effect of a normal retirement age (state pension age) rise from 60 to 61 be-
tween 2010 and 2012, the first steps of a rise up to 65 between 2010 and 2020. The authors have 
found that this increase had an effect of 7 percentage points. Using survey data allowed them to 
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look at the effect of spouse’s behaviour and have found that increases in women’s retirement 
ages had a “knock-on” effect on their husbands’ employment rates. 
There are only two studies quantifying the effect of increased retirement ages in Hungary, 
both using a non-econometric refinement to go beyond out of sample projections. The first nu-
merical results comes from the general-equilibrium microsimulation model of (Benczúr, Kátay, 
and Kiss 2012). Considering adjustment on both the external and internal margin, interaction of 
income received at the household-level and feedback through wages and market-level adjust-
ment, this study has simulated a one-year increase in the effective retirement age. According to 
the estimates, this leads to a 4.26 percentage point long-run increase in the employment rate of 
the 55-65 population. (Major and Varga 2013) adopt a different approach, building a optimising 
life-cycle model with trade-offs between consumption and labour supply in different parts of the 
life-cycle. Calibration of the model yields a 3.9-4.1 percentage point increase in the employment 
rate of the 55-65 year old male population, somewhat smaller than the other estimate. This 
smaller figure can be attributed to considering the disincentive effects of stronger discounting of 
the now more distant consumption as a pensioner as well as the decreased probability of reach-
ing this state, both are getting stronger with age. 
Even though available evidence makes it very likely that the increase in retirement ages 
played a major role in increasing the employment rate of older people, neither this claim nor the 
magnitude of the effect was supported by empirical evidence relying on within-sample econo-
metric estimates so far. This paper aims at providing reliable estimates for the immediate effect 
of increasing the retirement age for women in Hungary between 1999 and 2006. I use a differ-
ence in difference framework for estimating the impact of the increase in retirement ages sup-
ported by sharp changes in the age-criterion of the eligibility rule. Results show that increases in 
the normal retirement age had no effect on employment rates despite being numerous and span-
ning a wide range of ages. As a consequence, only effects for women are expected. A one-year 
increase in the early retirement age estimated to yield a 5-7.4 per cent increase of employment 
rates for all and by around 9.4 per cent for married women. An important additional insight is 
that the cohorts affected theoretically by the rise of retirement ages are the ones directly affected 
by a dramatic expansion of elementary and later by that of vocational schooling. 
The plan of the paper is the following. Section two describes the institutional framework in 
Hungary governing retirement into state pension and provides some relevant stylised facts. Sec-
tion three lays out the model behind the empirical analysis and discusses the identification strat-
egy. Section four provides estimation results for employment of the population as a whole and 
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also discusses the heterogeneity in the effects. Section five provides sensitivity analysis and dis-
cussion. Section six concludes. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, DATA AND STYLISED FACTS 
This section looks at the drivers behind the fact that the number of employed people among the 
55-64 year olds grew well above average during the first half or the 2000s. Whereas employment 
growth was only 117 thousand among the 15-64 year olds, 194 thousand 55-64 year old new em-
ployed persons were registered during the same period, by far the largest addition to the work-
force among all – see Figure 2 for the contribution of different age groups. In order to account 
for the role of the change in retirement ages in this, I first introduce the institutional framework 
of employment-related social security for older people and look at aggregate outcomes. Then I 
discuss the data used in the analysis and provide stylised facts on retirement behaviour and its 
interaction with labour market outcomes on a more disaggregated basis. 
Figure 2  
Age-employment profiles of men and women in 1999 and 2006 
Men Women 
  
Source: own calculations from the Labour Force Survey of the Hungarian Central Statistics Office 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal framework for retirement and pensions was modified frequently and to a great extent. 
The state pension system was reformed from the ground up in 1997 and later in 2011 by first cre-
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ating, then practically eliminating its private pillar. The main legal texts1 were modified many 
times, a process which I do not follow here, but look at the changes ex-post, the regulations pre-
vailing at the time when they become legally binding. Because of the dramatic effect of the 2009 
financial crisis on the labour market and the large number of changes to early retirement in the 
previous years as well as the special circumstances of introducing the pension reform, I am fo-
cussing on the years between 1999 and 2006. 
From the perspective of those retiring during the 1990s and the 2000s, Hungary operated a 
pay as you go, defined contribution pension system.2 In this period, all employed persons must 
pay a contribution to the pension fund as a defined portion of their gross salary. Pension claim-
ants are paid from this fund which is nevertheless topped up should it run at a deficit. These con-
tributions are used to pay the same year’s pension benefits, therefore a direct connection be-
tween individual pension contribution payment over the life-cycle and benefit received does not 
exists. The indirect connection is based on wages earned since 1988, which are later “valorised” 
according to a formula to determine starting pension levels. 
The colourful event history of the pension system was described in a number of publications, 
such as (Monostori 2008) and I do not aim to reproduce these here, but only give an outline of 
the most important changes. Apart from the introduction of a third pillar which does not affect 
those retiring during the 2000s, these were parametric. In the beginning of the 1990s, there was 
only a single normal retirement age (NRA) for men and women set at age 60 and 55, respective-
ly. From 1999 on, the NRA started to increase and the early retirement age (ERA) was intro-
duced for both women and men.  
Table 1 shows the NRA and the ERA (subheading “Age”) by female and male birth cohorts as 
defined by the law. In order to facilitate analysis, it also includes the implied calendar years 
(subheading “Implied year”), shown on Figure 3 too in a more graphic way. It is apparent that in 
the case of both sexes, there were much more changes to the NRA than the ERA. In the case of 
women, the latter has changed twice, while in the case of men, it has actually remained flat at the 
previous level of the NRA. 
                                                
1 Until 31 December 1997, act II of 1975 regulated the availability of state pension in Hungary. As of 1 
January 1998, it was replaced by act LXXXI. of 1997. 
2 During the 2000s, the pension system in Hungary also had a privately funded „pillar”, introduced with 
the 1997 pension reform. Members of this however did not become old enough to actually claim pension 
during the same period. This pillar was later practically abolished by the government having taken office in 
2010 by creating incentives that made most of the members exit the system. 
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Table 1  
Normal retirement ages (NRA) and early retirement ages  
(ERA) in Hungary between 1995 and 2012 
B
ir
th
 
 c
oh
or
t Women Men 
NRA ERA NRA ERA 
Age Implied 
year 
Age Implied 
year 
Age Implied 
year 
Age Implied 
year 
1937 55 1992 - - 60 1997 - - 
1938 55 1993 - - 61 1999 60 1998 
1939 55 1994 - - 62 2001 60 1999 
1940 55 1995 - - 62 2002 60 2000 
1941 55 1996 - - 62 2003 60 2001 
1942 57 1999 55 1997 62 2004 60 2002 
1943 58 2001 55 1998 62 2005 60 2003 
1944 59 2003 55 1999 62 2006 60 2004 
1945 60 2005 55 2000 62 2007 60 2005 
1946 61 2007 56 2002 62 2008 60 2006 
1947 62 2009 57 2004 62 2009 60 2007 
Source: retirement ages: act LXXXI. of 1997. and act LXXXI. of 1997 on 
social security pensions. The acts specify eligibility based on birth-year and 
age, not based on year and age. 
 
Figure 3 
 Normal and early retirement ages for women and men between 1996 and 2009 
 
 
Eligibility for pension benefit depends not only on age, but also on the number of “service” 
years. These are principally based on the number of years in which the individual has worked or 
paid social security contribution. Service years are gained also with higher education participa-
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tion and early years of childrearing. Set at 10 years in 1975, the number of service years required 
for a full normal pension was increased to 20 from 1991 on. For those having accumulated only 
10 service years, a partial pension benefit was made available with lower payment levels after 
this change. A full early retirement pension required much more service years, set at 37-38 for 
men and 34-38 for women. The timing of the change in required service years mimicked that of 
the rise in the ERA. Provided that other conditions hold, a partial early retirement was made 
available too with lower levels of payment. During the period we are looking at, old-age pensions 
are not differentiated by the means through which a claimant has entered it, the legal status is 
the same and the determined initial pension is increased by the legally set amount in each year. 
There are special types of old-age pensions too, including pensions to workers in particular 
professions, such as miners, performers, members of armed forces etc. They can retire with 
much less service years and also earlier than others. Another type of old-age pension is retire-
ment with age-concession (“korengedményes nyugdíj”), which was available from 1990 to work-
ers who were at most 5 years younger than the NRA and whose employee was willing to fund the 
pension payment completely until reaching the NRA. Yet another option was pre-retirement 
(“előnyugdíj”), available from 1991 as a pension-type unemployment benefit. These do not affect 
the discussion of rules to the normal old-age pension, but because they provided relatively esy 
exit routes before 1999, we start the analysis with this year. 
Older people do not receive only old-age pension, but also other pension-type benefits. The 
less important of these is widowers’ pension, a mere 5 per cent of newly determined pensions, 
paid at a significantly lower level than own old-age pensions. A more important alternative is 
disability pension, amounting to about 25 per cent of all newly determined pensions during the 
2000s, but reaching around 40% in some years. This pension comes in three slightly different 
varieties, depending on the degree of disability. Apart from being another important social trans-
fer, they also constitute an important exit route from the labour market (Scharle 2008). Rules of 
disability retirement were changed in 1997-1998 as a first attempt to get disability pension 
awards in line with actual health conditions. The major difference compared to the previous re-
gime was that eligibility to disability benefit was made temporary by default, requiring a more 
in-depth analysis of health conditions after a period of rehabilitation. Only those found to be 
disabled also after this period could obtain a permanent disability pension. Some changes in dis-
ability pension regulations and its potential effects overlap with the period analysed here, but we 
shall see that the particular empirical strategy I apply is not affected by it. 
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STYLISED FACTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PEOPLE 
The number and magnitude of changes to the old-age pension system suggests that they have 
ample potential to affect behaviour related to pension claims. As data in Table 2 show, this is not 
necessarily so. The beginning of the period shows a substantial drop in the number of claims 
before 1998, very much in line with the new restrictions on both old-age and disability pensions. 
After the transition year of 1999, the inflow to both types of pension grew, but to a different ex-
tent. Later changes in old-age pension reflect the bi-annual pattern of rising retirement ages: 
very few men retired in 1998 and 2000, and so did women in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 
at the normal age. It is important to note that very few have retired at the NRA after the ERA was 
made available: 70-90 per cent of the inflow to old-age type pension happened below the NRA. 
When gauging the potential impact of the rise in retirement ages, the figure to start from is its 
potential effect, bounded by the effective size of the cohorts for whom old-age pension is availa-
ble. According to figures derived from the 2001 Census and the 2005 Microcensus, the size of the 
55-64 age group has grown from 1.1 million to 1.2 million over five years. 40-60 per cent of 
women in the relevant cohorts were not retired before the ERA and 10-20 per cent not retired 
before the NRA according to data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The same figures are 20-
25 and 10-20 per cent for men for the ERA and the NRA respectively. Considering an average 
cohort size of 65 and 45 thousand in case of the two sexes, this means that increasing the NRA by 
one year can keep about 6,5-13 thousand women and 5-10 thousand men in the labour market 
on average. Increasing the ERA can retain about 26-39 thousand women and 9-11 thousand men 
on average. Comparing the 1999 and 2006 cross sections, there are one male (gain of 7.5 thou-
sand) and three female (gain of about 30 thousand) cohorts affected by the rise in the NRA, but 
no male and two female (gain of about 65) cohorts are affected by the rise in the ERA. This im-
plies a possible gain of about 102 thousand, much less than the observed 180 thousand individu-
als. 
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Table 2 
Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data on the number  
of newly determined old-age pension claims 
Year 
Disability and 
accident-related 
disability pensions 
Old-age and old-age type 
pensionsa 
From the total: at the NRA From the total: below the NRA 
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together 
1996 59 967 31 770 59 939 91 709 9 893 20 073 29 966 18 681 31 857 50 538 
1997 48 262 37 886 32 614 70 500 10 630 1 138 11 768 24 308 28 154 52 462 
1998 42 975 12 908 17 841 30 749 385 882 1 267 11 461 15 244 26 705 
1999 46 701 15 181 24 418 39 599 2 601 5 808 8 409 11 494 16 922 28 416 
2000 55 558 18 071 29 526 47 597 613 813 1 426 16 089 26 859 42 948 
2001 54 645 28 759 14 267 43 026 2 200 4 882 7 082 25 175 7 396 32 571 
2002 52 211 
30 20
9 
25 719 55 928 2 593 646 3 239 26 346 23 503 49 849 
2003 48 078 32 574 13 574 46 148 3 058 5 098 8 156 28 064 6 537 34 601 
2004 44 196 
35 94
0 
36 684 72 624 3 842 989 4 831 30 234 33 817 64 051 
2005 41 057 33 175 48 771 81 946 4 035 6 721 10 756 27 719 40 142 67 861 
2006 36 904 34 207 47 531 81 738 4 013 732 4 745 29 025 45 675 74 700 
2007 34 991 51 037 62 168 113 205 3 722 6 660 10 382 45 731 54 177 99 908 
a Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshold allowance (early retire-
ment), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions. 
b Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). The source of these 
statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the 
data for the armed forces and the police. Source: ONYF. 
Source: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_07 
 
 
The pattern of changes in the pension regulation makes it clear that if these changes do have 
an effect on employment, they do so on a cohort-specific way. Figure 4 shows the true life-cycle 
employment-age profile of the cohorts gaining eligibility to retirement between 1997 and 2007, 
calculated from the successive waves of the LFS (yearly weighted averages). The colour-coded 
profiles show a distinct pattern of transition between what seems to be two distinct equilibria. In 
the case of men, the change takes place between the ages 56-62. Cohorts 1936-1940 appear to be 
in an initial equilibrium, the change starting with cohort 1940. Cohort 1941 is within transition, 
while 1942 already seem to complete it. Later cohorts appear to blend into a second equilibrium.  
In the case of women, the transition is more interesting. The 1942 and older cohorts seem to be 
in an initial equilibrium. The transition starts with cohort 1943, cohorts 1944-1945 are within 
transition and cohort 1946 completes it. 
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Figure 4 
 Cohort-specific age-employment profiles of men and women  
reaching the retirement age between 1997 and 2007 
Men 
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Observe that the cohorts making the transition between the two equilibria are not necessarily 
the ones hit by the shock of changing retirement ages. In the case of men, the NRA was increased 
for those born in 1938 and 1939, cohorts whose profile blends well into the first equilibrium. 
Nothing was however changed for the two cohorts that do make the transition, providing strong 
evidence against the apparently clear role of pension regulations. In the case of women however, 
the first cohorts starting the transition already experience a change in the NRA and changes in 
later cohorts’ profiles coincide with changes in the ERA. Here we cannot rule out the connection 
between regulation and employment behaviour easily. 
Employment rate being the main focus of interest here, Figure 8 and Figure 9 in the Appen-
dix gives a bit more background detail by showing the same profiles for old-age pension and dis-
ability pension. Changes around the appropriate ERA for both men and women reflect what we 
have seen above in the case of employment rates, but a little more heterogeneity appears before 
the NRA, especially for women. Indeed, Figure 9 shows that changes in disability pension receipt 
might be a reason for this. While there appears to be no strong trend behind the changes in 
men’s disability claim profiles, those of women shift to the right with for later born cohorts. Af-
fecting mostly the second part of the period between the ERA and the NRA, this shift brings 
about 2-3-fold increases in disability claims. 
Key to our discussion is the way members of each cohort are spread out in time at the time 
they claim pension. In particular, the distribution of claims around and between the ERA and the 
NRA is decisive in relation to the potential effect of the hikes. Figure 5 shows the number of per-
sons having successfully claimed old-age pension in each year. Comparing this to the infor-
mation in Table 1, one finds that almost all claimants in all cohorts chose the first year allowed 
by regulation, which is at the ERA.3 The first we can observe in full is the 1939 male cohort, being 
also the first with the NRA set at 62 years and the ERA at 60. Most of this cohort claims pension 
in 1999 at the ERA, just a fraction in 2001 at the NRA, only a few persons thereafter. This pat-
tern repeats itself throughout the period we are looking at, in line with the fact that there was no 
change in regulation for the NRA later and none to the ERA at all. In the case of women, there is 
a much larger gap between the NRA and the ERA, claims being more spread out in time. The 
first cohort we follow in full is the one born in 1944, showing a pattern similar to that of men but 
with a larger response at the NRA. From the 1945 cohort on, the effect of the increase in retire-
ment ages appears visibly, inflows appearin in every other year. The large share of the outflow at 
the first possible exit date strongly suggests that only changes in regulation affecting the ERA 
can have a sizeable effect on pension claiming behaviour and thus on employment. 
                                                
3 Very few can and actually do so even earlier due to easier rules for some professions. 
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Figure 5  
The number of old-age pension claims by cohorts 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Source: calculations from the official pension claims statistics of 
the National Pension Directorate 
 
The employment effect of a change in regulation depends greatly on the employment poten-
tial of the affected population. Looking at the value of pension claims of the 1945 birth cohort as 
it ages (see this as an example Table 3 – the pattern is similar for other cohorts), the differences 
between initial pensions are substantial. The value of initial pensions attached to the large num-
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ber of claims made at the ERA (a little more than 50 per cent in the case of both men and wom-
en) are relative high, second to only those working well after the NRA (about 10 per cent for men 
and about 16 per cent for women). Average service years are long too for this group. This sug-
gests that those retiring at this age had and possibly have good labour market position on aver-
age at the point of claiming pension. 
The initial pension increases somewhat with age but drops to a much lower value at the NRA. 
Around 90 per cent of women, but only 66 per cent of men retire at or between the ERA and the 
NRA with increasingly favourable initial pension and the minimum required service years. Initial 
pensions are lower (in the case of men: much lower) at the NRA and so are service years, sug-
gesting that this group is rather different from the earlier ones, having a weak labour market 
position, particularly short service years and low levels of contribution payments. The few retir-
ing before the NRA are very different in the case of men and women, the former appear to be 
enjoying more favourable conditions, probably because of the larger share of professions with 
special retirement options (such as miners and members of armed forces). 
Even though this paper does not seek to provide a general explanation to the rise in employ-
ment rates of older people, it is instructive to look at alternative explanations beside changes in 
pension regulations. The first and most important explanation to consider is education, in par-
ticular the dramatically rising education level of the affected cohorts (Augusztinovics and Köllő 
2007). The difference between the 55-64 year olds in 1999 made up by the 1935-1944 cohorts 
and those in 2006 made up by the 1942-1951 cohorts is substantial in terms of education attain-
ment. In 1940, the parliament has adopted an act that introduced 8 grades of mandatory ele-
mentary schooling. This reform was initiated by Kuno Klébelsberg, the education minister be-
tween 1922 and 1931, but postponed in 1929 due to the economic crisis. The communist govern-
ments that took power in 1949 in Hungary have carried on with implementing the reform and 
later increased the mandatory schooling age to 16 (Kazuska 2012). Census data from 1960 show 
that the proportion of 10 year olds learned reading at most decreased from 9.3 per cent in 1941 to 
3 per cent in 1960, while that of 15 year olds having completed at least primary school has in-
creased 12.9 to 32.8 per cent (see (KSH 1962) page 28). Much of these differences prevail in the 
2000s too: we find that in the 2002 cross-section, the share of those having completed at most 8 
years of primary schooling is 54.5 per cent for the 1941 cohort, but only half of this, a mere 27 per 
cent for the 1950 cohort. The share of those having completed lower vocational education has 
increased from 3.2 to 30 per cent for the same cohorts. 
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Table 3  
Statistics of initial pensions of the 1945 birth cohort  
by age at the initial pension payment 
Men Initial pension Service years 
 
Women Initial pension Service years 
 
N % 
(at 2000 
prices) Mean Std. D. 
  
N % 
(at 2000 
prices) Mean Std. D. 
52 1 0% 25473 27,0 0,0 
 
52 2 0% 19525 34,5 2,1 
53 384 1% 24781 32,3 6,0 
 
53 492 1% 23873 31,5 7,2 
54 1504 4% 32893 34,3 5,2 
 
54 1376 4% 27582 32,0 6,9 
55 1964 5% 36376 35,3 5,1 
 
55 20971 56% 35479 36,8 3,0 
56 1863 5% 38975 36,3 5,0 
 
56 4101 11% 37504 35,0 4,5 
57 263 1% 49026 38,3 4,7 
 
57 2094 6% 37238 34,4 5,4 
58 2435 7% 53469 38,7 5,1 
 
58 157 0% 39977 34,3 5,4 
59 1601 4% 59541 39,3 5,3 
 
59 141 0% 49355 35,0 6,5 
60 20274 56% 66082 41,5 3,3 
 
60 6478 17% 34912 27,9 6,8 
61 1821 5% 72988 39,3 5,0 
 
61 711 2% 58749 33,5 9,5 
62 3555 10% 49754 30,5 7,4 
 
62 454 1% 63035 31,9 10,6 
63 170 0% 37431 26,8 9,9 
 
63 79 0% 33015 23,4 9,4 
64 113 0% 50727 28,9 10,5 
 
64 54 0% 36911 22,8 9,8 
65 30 0% 71080 32,1 12,8 
 
65 16 0% 47651 25,3 13,5 
∑ 35978 100% 
    
∑ 37126 100% 
   Source: calculations using the NYUGDMEG database on pension claims and payments 
 
 
The changes in school attendance of persons born between 1940 and 1950 is rather dramatic, 
comparable only to the decrease of zero school attendance from the end of the 1920s through the 
1930s and the expansion of higher education during the 2000s. Given that the employment rate 
of 55-64 year old people with at most primary education was 12 per cent in 1999, whereas that of 
those with completed lower vocational secondary education was 32 per cent, such a shift implies 
a substantial increase in employment rates in itself. Indeed, if we hold schooling-specific em-
ployment rates constant at their 1999 level, we see that such a change in composition can gener-
ate a rise of the employment rate from 19.3 to 25.5, a gain of 75 thousand employees. This is 
about 44 per of the observed gain of 173 thousand – the remainder comes from the increase in 
employment rates to be explained by factors other than changes in schooling attendance. It is 
reassuring that the implied remaining gain of about 100 thousand is almost exactly equal to the 
potential effect of rising the retirement age calculated earlier. 
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3. IDENTIFICATION, ESTIMATION AND DATA 
The problem of estimating the causal effect of the rising retirement age on employment is the 
one familiar from program evaluation: estimation results from comparing individuals who self-
select to being claimants and non-claimants on the basis of characteristics potentially correlated 
with the intervention can be very inaccurate. In order to overcome this difficulty, I follow the 
difference-in-difference approach of (Staubli and Zweimüller 2011) and (Cribb, Emmerson, and 
Tetlow 2013). The idea behind applying this workhorse of program evaluation is that we can ex-
ploit the sharp difference between cohorts who are eligible to pension at a certain age before a 
rise and those who fall short of this eligibility after the rise. Thinking about the rise in retirement 
ages as a treatment, the former is the control, the latter is the treatment group. Comparing 
changes in employment rates of one cohort before and after the retirement age gives an estimate 
contaminated with composition and life-cycle effects. Comparing this change of two adjacent 
cohorts, the control and the treated before and after the change gets rid of all of these effects and 
uses the variation introduced by the rising retirement age. The fact that legislation makes this 
difference sharp over time helps a great deal to make this comparison accurate, closely mimick-
ing a comparison with an outcome in case the treatment was not in fact administered to mem-
bers of the treatment group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6  
Difference-in-difference estimation of the effect of rising retire-
ment ages 
t t+1 
(55) 
(55) 
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To see how this works, consider the following example illustrated in Figure 6. We have two 
cohorts born in 1945 and 1946. Members of the first one turn 55 during year t and do so one by 
one, indicated by steep side of the triangle. Members of the second cohort turn 55 a year later in 
t+1 the same way. We can compare behaviour “just before” and “just after” being exactly 55 to 
obtain estimates. Note that the difference between employment rates “just before” and “just af-
ter” the retirement age is the slope of the age-employment profile for a cohort and the difference 
between these differences for the two cohorts in consideration is the difference between the 
slopes. In the current case we are computing averages over individuals within a cohort who are 
connected by their position on their personal timeline of age, being just before and after 55, re-
spectively – these are the averages represented by each side of the small horizontal lines. Births 
are almost uniformly distributed over the year, therefore we have a full coverage of the whole 
year with simple averaging. Any time-invariant feature that is correlated with time within the 
year is controlled for this way. 
Time being continuous, we can freely define and change the concept of “just before” and “just 
after” by using a narrower or broader windows around that age (making the small lines on Figure 
6 shorter or longer, respectively). Using a smaller window gathers less observations leading to 
less precision, but more homogeneous groups – there is no rule of thumb for selecting an opti-
mal window. One also has to make a decision about the discretisation of the continuous time that 
is about the units in which employment rate averages are made. Again, there is no rule of thumb 
for doing this, but one should respect the familiar consideration between bias and variance as 
well as practical considerations, such as the sampling scheme of the underlying data. 
Both the DiD method and the window used in it emphasize that estimates produced here are 
local and immediate effects. They are immediate as the logic can in no way take into account 
effects of the impulse that do not manifest themselves in a slope change within the vicinity of the 
impulse, that is a change in the slope of the age-employment-rate profile at the formerly prevail-
ing ERA. In the extreme case when there is no slope change, but only a parallel shift of the pro-
files, we will measure no effect and for good reason: whatever change has happened can no be 
attributed directly to the rule change we are looking at. The difference will of course visible in the 
cleaned difference between the treated and the control cohorts, but because this can also be a 
cohort-effect, we cannot identify it with the impact of the treatment. Varying the window size 
and looking at the estimated effects can give an idea of the actual size of the effect in case the 
adjustment does not take place close to the focal age. Finding no significant impact estimates 
with narrow windows sizes but some with broader ones is consistent with a delayed impact. The 
opposite pattern, that is having a large and/or significant effect with smaller window size and 
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small/insignificant with a broader one on the other hand is consistent with a substantial local, 
but no significant change in the slope further away from the point of change. 
The treatment we consider in this exercise is revoking of retirement option from a certain 
cohort at a point in time. Figure 7 shows all such treatments during the period between 1999 and 
2007. Consider for example the 1945 and the 1946 female cohorts. Members of the former could 
claim early retirement at the age of 55, but the latter will be able to do so only when they turn 56. 
The orange mark for cohort 1946 at age 55 indicates that they receive a treatment of not being 
able to claim pension at this age. In this case, we would compare outcomes for the two cohorts 
just before and after their members turn 55. This implies that we are looking at the years 2000 
and 2001. 
 
Figure 7 
Treatments on pension claiming opportunities between 1999 and 2007  
(years in columns, cohorts in rows, interventions shown with colour shading: blue 
= NRA rise for men, red = NRA rise for women, orange = ERA rise for women) 
	  
1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	  
1935	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	   69	   70	   71	   72	  
1936	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	   69	   70	   71	  
1937	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	   69	   70	  
1938	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	   69	  
1939	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	  
1940	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	  
1941	   58	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	  
1942	   57	   58	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	  
1943	   56	   57	   58	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	  
1944	   55	   56	   57	   58	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	  
1945	   54	   55	   56	   57	   58	   59	   60	   61	   62	  
1946	   53	   54	   55	   56	   57	   58	   59	   60	   61	  
1947	   52	   53	   54	   55	   56	   57	   58	   59	   60	  
1948	   51	   52	   53	   54	   55	   56	   57	   58	   59	  
1949	   50	   51	   52	   53	   54	   55	   56	   57	   58	  
1950	   49	   50	   51	   52	   53	   54	   55	   56	   57	  
1951	   48	   49	   50	   51	   52	   53	   54	   55	   56	  
1952	   47	   48	   49	   50	   51	   52	   53	   54	   55	  
Source: act II. of 1975 and act LXXXI. of 1997 
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Between-cohort differences coming from genuine cohort effects and from the fact that co-
horts are observed in different points in calendar time can be controlled for by standard regres-
sion techniques with an equation such as the following: 
 𝜙(𝑦!) = 𝛼 + (𝛿𝑝!" + 𝛾𝑙!𝑝!" + 𝜃𝑙!)+ (𝜉𝑏!"# + 𝜂! + 𝑞! + 𝑦!)+ 𝛽!𝑋!!"# + 𝛽!𝑋!!"# + ϵ!"#  ,   (1) 
 
where 𝜙(𝑦!) is an appropriate function of the labour-market outcome we are interested in,  𝑙! is 
an indicator of cohort membership and 𝑝!" is an indicator of being treated. Using a sample period 
that has an appropriate span before and after the treatment and including the above terms as 
well as their interaction (in the first bracket in equation (1)) is the simplest estimation method. 
The coefficient on 𝑙! gives us the difference in the outcome between the two cohorts, while the 
coefficient on 𝑝!" gives us the difference in outcomes before and after the retirement age, aver-
aged over the whole sample. The coefficient of the interaction term gives us the difference be-
tween the two, which we can under the set circumstances identify with the program effect. If we 
look at a wider time span or stack periods for greater efficiency, we have to take into account 
cohort and time-effects – these are represented by terms in the second bracket. Finally, there 
might be differences across individuals, which change over time and are connected to individual 
characteristics we observe. We can enter these as another set of terms, shown in the third brack-
et. The term ϵ!" is an individual- and time-specific stochastic driver unrelated to any of the previ-
ous observed characteristics. 
Equation (1) assumes that the impact, that is the change in being under or below the retire-
ment age depends only on age and on the actual time period through the retirement rule in ef-
fect: 𝑝! = 𝜋!(𝑎!"). Let us model this effect by a multiplier 𝑚!" to get 𝑝′!" = 𝑝′!" ∗𝑚! = 𝜋! 𝑎!" 𝑚!". 
The estimating equation now becomes 
 𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝!"𝑚! + 𝛾𝑙!𝑝!"𝑚! + 𝜃𝑙! + 𝜉𝑏!"# + 𝜂! + 𝑞! + 𝑦! + 𝛽!𝑋!!"# + 𝛽!𝑋!!"# + ϵ!"#.   (2) 
 
Unfortunately it is not possible to observe 𝑚! directly, but using the results of (Auguszti-
novics and Köllő 2007) on the effect of education on work experience, we can reasonably approx-
imate it with a set of education indicators. 
I shall estimate equation (1) and (2) on microdata from the quarterly waves of the Hungarian 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a survey conducted by the Hungarian Central Statistics 
Office to characterise the Hungarian labour market using concepts standardised and suggested 
by the International Labour Organisation. It provides individual-level data on around 80 thou-
sand individuals of all ages, but focuses on those in “active age”, defined as the 15-74 population. 
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Detailed demographic information is available for everyone in this age group, complemented by 
data on employment or unemployment, as appropriate. Although individuals can be followed 
across quarters, they are retained only for 6 months and thus the data are not suitable to build 
longer panel data set. Because there are practically no intervention hitting men, the estimation 
sample is constrained to women only. The actual estimating sample is constrained to those be-
low and above the pensionable age prevailing before the treatment, defined by the size of the 
window around this age. Because of the sampling scheme of the LFS, I am using quarters as 
units to define the window around a particular age, using a window size of 1 to 4. 
The choice of the outcome variable expresses how deep we would like to dwell into the struc-
ture of the relationship of retirement and employment. Available studies on the effect of retire-
ment age rise in Hungary rely on rich model structure making the interaction between old-age 
retirement, employment and possibly between activity and other exit routes from the economy 
explicit. Although it is impractical to combine this richness with the econometric approach set 
out above, introducing the related outcome variables and estimating the effect of retirement age 
rise on them can shed light on the transmission process between them. The immediate effect of a 
rise in retirement age affects the timing of old-age pension claims. If the correlation is strong 
enough, it also affects activity, which in turn affects employment with a strength depending on 
the interaction of individual characteristics and labour market conditions. Using old-age pension 
claims, activity and employment rate provides us with an implicit characterisation of this trans-
mission process. Given that there are other exit routes form the labour market such as disability 
pension, a decrease in pension claims can be correlated with an increase in disability pension 
claims, in particular if there is no effect on the employment outcome. 
I use a probit estimator to control for observed heterogeneity remaining in the control and 
the treatment groups because in some cases the mean of the outcome variable is much smaller 
than 50 per cent. Unfortunately the probit cannot properly use weights and does not literally 
implement a DiD estimator, therefore I also use linear ordinary least squares in the sensitivity 
analysis to look at the robustness of the results. Given that the mean of the binary outcome vari-
able is 46.2 for the most relevant scenario (NRA, full sample), a linear probability model is safe 
to use in that case. Because the LFS is a rotating panel with overlaps between quarters, the calcu-
lation of standard errors takes into account the clustering of unobserved heterogeneity due to 
repeated sampling of the same individuals over time. 
I estimate the effect of raising the NRA and the ERA separately as they affect very different 
populations, I pool the relevant data for efficiency reasons. This means that calendar times are 
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forgone and only treatment status as well as before- and after ages are considered. Appropriate-
ly, indicators for months and years are included to control for the effect of calendar times. 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
I consider estimates from a number of specifications. I refer to the first set based on equation (1) 
as “homogeneous impact” estimates. The first (1) specification contains only the variables neces-
sary to define a DiD estimator. The second (2) one introduces variables with impact at the macro 
level: indicators for years, quarters and counties of residence in order to control for differences 
between the two periods over which the two cohorts are measured. The third (3) specification 
adds individual-specific variables, education and family status. We have seen the importance of 
the former earlier and discussed the potential role of the latter. Specification (4) is based on 
specification (3), but the “Impact” indicator is interacted with indicators of education attain-
ment, a proxy for labour market history to produce heterogeneous impact estimates. Specifica-
tion (5) goes back to specification (3) but is estimated on a smaller sample of those living with a 
partner. In addition to this, it includes indicators on the partner’s employment and unemploy-
ment status, education attainment and a linear age variable. In order to keep homogeneity of 
groups but gain in sample size, I settled with a window size of 4 quarters (see the sensitivity 
analysis in the next section for a discussion). 
Estimates of the impact of four pooled NRA hikes appear in general as relatively precise ze-
roes in Table 4. The single consistently significant coefficient is the positive employment ad-
vantage of the younger cohorts, estimated to be between 2.5-2.9 percentage points – note that if 
there was any effect of the NRA hike unfolding earlier than the eligibility age, it might be sub-
sumed in these effects. Indeed, going back to Figure 2, no difference in slopes, but a clear differ-
ence in levels can be observed, with greater differences between older than between younger co-
horts. Temporal aggregate variables do not matter much but spatial ones do, introducing an em-
ployment penalty relative to the capital (neither are shown here). While none of the family status 
indicators have significant coefficients, both the significance and the magnitude of those of 
schooling are stable across specifications. Among those who live with a partner, employment of 
the partner increases the chance of employment too. These results indicate that increasing the 
NRA has likely to had no measurable immediate effect on employment chances except when we 
separate those with higher education level. In that case, we find that the increases have no signif-
icant effect on the employment rates on them, but have on the rest of the population. Looking at 
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the evidence presented in Table 3, this is no wonder: those with good labour market chances 
have already claimed pension by the time they reach the NRA or will do so years after. 
Table 4  
Estimation results for the NRA hike episodes with employment as the outcome 
(probability contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates;  
window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) -0.00678 0.0246 0.0206 0.0605* -0.0133 
 (0.0155) (0.0209) (0.0203) (0.0310) (0.0205) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    0.00821  
    (0.0457)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    -0.0374  
    (0.0274)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0908***  
    (0.0203)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.0311*** 0.0283*** 0.0289*** 0.0291*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.00828) (0.00840) (0.00813) (0.00817) (0.00944) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.0280*** -0.0317*** -0.0263*** -0.0263*** -0.0142* 
 (0.00761) (0.00773) (0.00753) (0.00757) (0.00861) 
Education: lower secondary   0.0654*** 0.0624*** 0.0301 
   (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0201) 
Education: upper secondary   0.117*** 0.120*** 0.0649*** 
   (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0161) 
Education: higher   0.396*** 0.411*** 0.304*** 
   (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0344) 
Partner works     0.170*** 
     (0.0168) 
Observations 28,861 28,861 28,861 28,861 19,700 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month 
and county dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, 
(4) same as in (3) 
 
 
Repeating the above estimates for activity as an outcome yields a very similar result (see Ta-
ble 7 in the Appendix), but switching to pension claims helps opening up the reasons behind the 
lack of effect for people with lower than higher education. Table 8 and Table 9 in the Appendix 
show estimates with old-age- and disability pensioner status on the left-hand side of the estimat-
ing equation. Contrary to the results for employment, the increase of retirement ages have a sig-
nificant negative effect on old-age pension claims at the order between -4.4 to -7 percentage 
points. Those with higher education are again an exception with a 3 percentage point effect. The 
answer to why a significant effect on old-age pensions does not translate to activity and employ-
ment improvement lies in the estimates for disability pension claims: these are about the same 
size as the effects on old-age pension claims, but have the opposite sign. This means that while 
the increase in retirement ages did decrease old-age pension claims, they were absorbed by disa-
bility pension claims. The former negative effect on employment of the higher educated is ex-
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plained by the fact that there is no such balancing effect in their case. Note that despite the sig-
nificant effects, these results concern only a small fraction of the population: according to Table 
3, only about 30 per cent of a cohort has not claimed old-age pension at ages before the NRA. 
Turning to the two hikes in the ERA, we see much more action and a significant effect on 
employment. The structure of Table 5 is identical to the previous one showing five specifications, 
four of which are estimated for all individuals in the sample and the last for only those living 
with a partner. The most significant difference from the previous results is that increasing the 
ERA appears to have had a significant effect on employment rates in all but one specifications. 
Specification (1) already shows that younger cohorts have significantly higher employment rates 
and so do the younger irrespective of which cohort they belong to. Moving from (1) to (2), aggre-
gate effects take away the confounding difference between time periods and regions. As in the 
case of the NRA, differences between cohorts are a mixture of cohort-effects and potential indi-
rect effects of the retirement age hike that unfold earlier and appear as a level shift. They are 
much stronger than in the case of the NRA and their magnitude are comparable to that of the 
impact estimate itself. 
Education has a profound effect on employment rates, sometimes even larger than around 
the NRA, in particular for those with upper secondary or higher education – see specification (3). 
Notice that despite of the sizeable effect of education, it does not affect the estimate of the impact 
directly due to the good separation of control and treatment groups through the age-based eligi-
bility rule. Moving to specification (4) with heterogeneous-effects, the significance of the impact 
estimate is lost. Its magnitude increases significantly as we turn to those living with partners. 
Similarly to results for the NRA, a working partner increases the chance of being at work signifi-
cantly and irrespectively from age. It is interesting to note that the partner’s higher education 
attainment has an independent positive effect (at about 7 percentage point) on employment rates 
even after controlling for the actual employment of the partner. Marriage appears to command a 
significant premium as opposed to cohabitation at 13 percentage points (coefficient not included 
in the table). Using activity on the left-hand side of the equation yields estimates that are not 
significantly different from what we have obtained here, the only difference being a significant 
estimate for the heterogeneous case too (see Table 10 in the Appendix). This implies that the 
effect on employment is not only significant, but is transmitted without resulting in a notable 
increase in unemployment. 
Estimates with old-age pension and disability pension on their left-hand side explain why we 
observe positive employment effects in this case. There is a strong negative effect on claiming 
old-age pension in all specifications, but none on disability pension. Estimates are between 7 and 
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8.8 percentage point, comparable to the employment and activity gains seen earlier. There is 
remarkable heterogeneity behind these average estimates: those with higher education appear to 
have reduced old-age and increased disability pension claims at a very high level of about 15 and 
20 percentage points respectively. 
Table 5  
Estimation results for the two ERA episodes with employment as the outcome 
(probability contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 
4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) 0.0481** 0.0639** 0.0690** 0.0493 0.0947*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0263) (0.0274) (0.0350) (0.0336) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    0.0611  
    (0.0565)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    0.0442  
    (0.0454)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0662  
    (0.0702)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.0443*** 0.0507*** 0.0592*** 0.0594*** 0.0660*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0219) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.0997*** -0.105*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0198) 
Education: lower secondary   0.129*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
   (0.0249) (0.0271) (0.0307) 
Education: upper secondary   0.243*** 0.236*** 0.199*** 
   (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0263) 
Education: higher   0.455*** 0.459*** 0.391*** 
   (0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0312) 
Partner works     0.169*** 
     (0.0222) 
Observations 15,624 15,624 15,624 15,624 10,971 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month 
and county dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, 
(4) same as in (3) 
 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
To assess the sensitivity of the above results to different assumptions, I have performed a num-
ber of sensitivity checks. The first of these is varying windows sizes used in the DiD estimation 
because as already mentioned, there is no rule of thumb to guide our choice of the window size 
around the retirement age. I have chosen a 4-quarter window because estimates from that on 
showed the least change across all models and specifications, but this choice is not the only one 
possible. Table 6 shows estimates of the “Impact” parameter shown earlier for the NRA hikes in 
all specifications for employment. Sample sizes vary from 4428 to 22.318 as we move from a 
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window of 1 to 6 quarters. Using one or two quarters only appears to be too small of a sample 
size, producing estimates that are not significantly different from zero except for specification (5) 
and a window of 1 quarter. The effect of increasing the window size is exactly what we expect 
with a temporally local impact: larger windows sizes yield larger and more significant point es-
timates. A 4 quarter window does not only seem to be a good compromise in the stability of es-
timates while staying close to the focal age, but also yields stable results in the case of NRA-
related estimates (not shown here). 
Table 6  
Sensitivity of impact estimates to the size of the window around the retirement age 
(ERA, employment on the left-hand side) 
Window size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 0.0048 0.0246 0.0248 0.0165 0.0512** 
2 0.0042 0.0201 0.0202 0.0162 0.0409 
3 0.0310 0.0488** 0.0499** 0.0335 0.0722** 
4 0.0481** 0.0639** 0.0690** 0.0493 0.0947*** 
5 0.0554** 0.0850*** 0.0935*** 0.0796** 0.1130*** 
6 0.0533** 0.1070*** 0.1170*** 0.1070*** 0.1230*** 
Remark: see remarks for Table 5. 
 
 
The estimates included in the previous section come from a probit model to accommodate 
the unbalanced share of outcomes in some cases, especially in the NRA hike episodes. Because 
probit estimates are inconsistent when weighted, these estiamates are missing the weights that 
come with the LFS required to restore the desired sample structure. Except for the quarter 1 es-
timate for specification (5), both the pattern and the magnitude of the estimates are the same as 
before. 
All of the above use the full sample to estimate the impact of the intervention. One can argue 
that a sharper local estimate obtains if we focus on the exact time when the policy change took 
place. Because such changes are tied to calendar years that is from quarter 4 in year t to quarter 1 
in year t+1, this obtains when constraining estimation to the winter quarters only. I have repeat-
ed the estimates with this restriction for all specifications and have found estimates similar in 
magnitude and significance to those from the full sample. 
I have also performed a so-called placebo check for all of the specifications showed above. If 
the effect estimated is to be trusted, we have to make sure that it is not a product of simple coin-
cidence. To look at this, I have defined the treatment variable to pick different cohorts than the 
ones having actually received the treatment: the 1945 and 1948 cohorts became treated, the 1944 
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and 1947 became controls with ages 55 and 56 remaining the former retirement ages respective-
ly. In both cases I have run the same regressions as before and obtained similar patterns in terms 
of explanatory power and the significance of additional variables, but the impact variable was not 
significantly different from zero in all cases. 
Based on the above results, we can be fairly certain that the immediate effect of increasing 
the effective retirement age by one year increases the employment rate of women at least by 5-7 
per cent for all and by around 9.5 per cent for married women. Making looser identifying as-
sumptions, we might want to increase these estimates to 10.7-11.7 and 12.3 per cent respectively. 
This estimated impact is coming entirely from changes in ERA rules and is somewhat smaller 
than the available estimates relating to much broader populations and concepts. The interven-
tion appears to affect old-age pension claims directly, but does not seem to have an effect on dis-
ability benefit claims except for higher educated persons, which is difficult to explain. The pat-
tern is very different for the NRA, where disability seems to have an important role in diverting 
the affected individuals away from the labour market and yielding ultimately to an employment 
effect, which is not significantly different from zero. 
The strength of the applied method is its precision and clear focus on those immediately af-
fected by the change. The same feature is a limitation too, as concentrating only on the immedi-
ately affected groups is likely to miss spillover- and life-cycle effects, captured by the model of 
(Major and Varga 2013) among others. If these exist and are net positive, then the total effect is 
underestimated here, the strategy missing important groups affected by the change for example 
those not close to the cut-off age. Indeed, the estimating results being sensitive to the choice of 
the window size is an indication of room for improvement in this regard. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The recent rise in normal retirement ages in several countries has triggered a surge of interest in 
the precise labour market effect of these measures. Following earlier estimates of the role of oth-
er parameters of the pension system in shaping labour market outcomes, a literature on the ef-
fect of increasing pension age started to develop recently. This paper contributes to this litera-
ture by estimating the effect of various episodes of increasing the normal retirement age (NRA) 
and early retirement age (ERA) for women in Hungary between 1999 and 2006. The effect is 
estimated for both types of interventions on survey data that enables looking at different out-
comes and the effect of partners’ characteristics. The method used is difference in differences 
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defining control and treatment groups based on the changes in the sharp age-based eligibility 
rules of old-age pension, providing a precise source of identification. 
The applied procedure did not aim at and is also incapable of explaining the complete change 
in employment rates of older people over the observed period, but the analysis highlighted the 
importance to consider cohort-related confounding factors. The most important of this is school-
ing, responsible for half of the increase in employment rates. Indeed, the reform appears to be 
targeted at cohorts with vastly improved labour market chances compared to previous ones due 
to the introduction of mandatory schooling until age 14 and later 16 as well as the mainstreaming 
of lower vocational schooling during the 1940s and 50s. 
Estimates reveal an interplay of claiming old-age and disability pension as well as labour 
market status and put existing estimates in perspective. A one year increase in the NRA induces 
at least a 4.4-7 percentage point decrease in claiming old-age pension, which is however ab-
sorbed by a similar increase of disability pension claims. This translates to an ultimately zero 
effect on employment and activity. Estimates relating to the ERA confirm earlier findings, that 
increases in the retirement age have had a positive effect on the employment rate of women in 
the age groups becoming ineligible to state pension after the reform. A one-year increase in the 
retirement age estimated to yield a 5-7.4 per cent increase of employment rates for all and by 
around 9.4 per cent for married women. Considering that the employment rate of the affected 
cohorts is around 45 per cent prior and around 38 per cent after the ERA, this is a significant 
impact. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 8  
Cohort-specific age-old-age pensioner profiles of men and women reaching the re-
tirement age between 1997 and 2007 
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Figure 9  
Cohort-specific age-disability pensioner profiles of men and women reaching the 
retirement age between 1997 and 2007 
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Table 7  
Estimation results for the NRA hike episodes with activity as the outcome  
(probability contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates;  
window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) -0.00423 0.0249 0.0209 0.0612** -0.00451 
 (0.0158) (0.0210) (0.0204) (0.0306) (0.0215) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    0.00302  
    (0.0452)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    -0.0376  
    (0.0277)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0917***  
    (0.0210)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.0333*** 0.0310*** 0.0318*** 0.0319*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.00835) (0.00850) (0.00825) (0.00828) (0.00959) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.0277*** -0.0311*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0146* 
 (0.00768) (0.00782) (0.00765) (0.00768) (0.00874) 
Education: lower secondary   0.0613*** 0.0590*** 0.0260 
   (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0201) 
Education: upper secondary   0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0643*** 
   (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0161) 
Education: higher   0.397*** 0.412*** 0.310*** 
   (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0345) 
Partner works     0.172*** 
     (0.0169) 
Observations 28,861 28,861 28,861 28,861 19,700 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county 
dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
 
Table 8  
Estimation results for the NRA hike episodes with claiming old-age pension as the outcome (probabil-
ity contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) -0.0222 -0.0442*** -0.0436*** -0.0694*** -0.0591*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0183) (0.0190) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    0.0330  
    (0.0343)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    0.0349  
    (0.0250)  
Impact*education: higher    0.104***  
    (0.0294)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) -0.0353*** -0.0401*** -0.0457*** -0.0454*** -0.0328** 
 (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0141) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) 0.0486*** 0.0483*** 0.0506*** 0.0506*** 0.0521*** 
 (0.00918) (0.00948) (0.00954) (0.00954) (0.0116) 
Education: lower secondary   0.112*** 0.108*** 0.122*** 
   (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0244) 
Education: upper secondary   0.146*** 0.142*** 0.166*** 
   (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0200) 
Education: higher   0.0309 0.0151 0.0459 
   (0.0222) (0.0230) (0.0336) 
Partner works     -0.0759*** 
     (0.0214) 
Observations 23,324 23,324 23,324 23,324 15,884 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county 
dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
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Table 9 
Estimation results for the NRA hike episodes with claiming disability pension as the outcome (proba-
bility contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) 0.0347* 0.0407* 0.0406* 0.0594* 0.0760** 
 (0.0189) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0305) (0.0302) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    -0.0528  
    (0.0426)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    -0.00991  
    (0.0357)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0785  
    (0.0496)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.0241*** 0.0181** 0.0207** 0.0207** 0.0109 
 (0.00892) (0.00915) (0.00910) (0.00910) (0.0110) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.0257*** -0.0302*** -0.0332*** -0.0331*** -0.0352*** 
 (0.00840) (0.00840) (0.00834) (0.00833) (0.0100) 
Education: lower secondary   -0.0676*** -0.0634*** -0.0619*** 
   (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0178) 
Education: upper secondary   -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.101*** 
   (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0143) 
Education: higher   -0.163*** -0.159*** -0.136*** 
   (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0172) 
Partner works     -0.0450*** 
     (0.0152) 
Observations 28,861 28,861 28,861 28,861 19,700 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county 
dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
 
Table 10  
Estimation results for the ERA hike episodes with activity as the outcome  
(probability contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) 0.0575** 0.0698*** 0.0752*** 0.0605* 0.0952*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0262) (0.0273) (0.0347) (0.0333) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    0.0557  
    (0.0562)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    0.0346  
    (0.0455)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0759  
    (0.0710)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.0425*** 0.0546*** 0.0638*** 0.0641*** 0.0743*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0218) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0199) 
Education: lower secondary   0.117*** 0.107*** 0.101*** 
   (0.0248) (0.0270) (0.0306) 
Education: upper secondary   0.244*** 0.239*** 0.191*** 
   (0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0261) 
Education: higher   0.441*** 0.447*** 0.374*** 
   (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0315) 
Partner works     0.168*** 
     (0.0221) 
Observations 15,624 15,624 15,624 15,624 10,971 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county 
dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
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Table 11  
Estimation results for the ERA hike episodes with claiming old-age pension as the outcome (probabil-
ity contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) -0.0669*** -0.0770*** -0.0782*** -0.0524*** -0.0879*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0187) (0.0138) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    -0.0113  
    (0.0357)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    -0.0654***  
    (0.0199)  
Impact*education: higher    -0.0902***  
    (0.0218)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) -0.0663*** -0.0781*** -0.0784*** -0.0780*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0147) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) 0.119*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00994) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0128) 
Education: lower secondary   0.0213 0.0222 0.0214 
   (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0204) 
Education: upper secondary   0.0290** 0.0404*** 0.0316* 
   (0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0184) 
Education: higher   -0.0220 -0.0109 -0.00831 
   (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0251) 
Partner works     -0.0417*** 
     (0.0137) 
Observations 15,624 15,624 15,624 15,624 10,971 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county dummies 
(for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
 
Table 12  
Estimation results for the ERA hike episodes with claiming disability pension as the outcome (proba-
bility contributions calculated from unweighted probit estimates; window = 4 quarter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Impact (Treated*Above) 0.0322 0.00133 0.00518 -0.0106 0.0134 
 (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0299) (0.0304) 
Impact*education: lower secondary    -0.0119  
    (0.0496)  
Impact*education: upper secondary    0.0193  
    (0.0417)  
Impact*education: higher    0.201***  
    (0.0760)  
Treated (cohort with increased NRA) 0.00463 0.00101 -0.00304 -0.00341 -0.0154 
 (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0193) 
Above (the NRA before the treatment) -0.00369 0.00103 -0.00213 -0.00214 0.0168 
 (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0174) 
Education: lower secondary   -0.0598*** -0.0571** -0.0452* 
   (0.0209) (0.0225) (0.0253) 
Education: upper secondary   -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.112*** 
   (0.0162) (0.0174) (0.0228) 
Education: higher   -0.275*** -0.288*** -0.219*** 
   (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0253) 
Partner works     -0.0853*** 
     (0.0202) 
Observations 15,624 15,624 15,624 15,624 10,971 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include the following variables beside those shown: (2) a full set of year, month and county 
dummies (for place of residence), (3) in addition to (2): indicators of family status, (4) same as in (3) 
 
 
